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Michael Starks 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Probably the leading exponent of Wittgenstein’s ideas on the language games 
of inner and outer (the ‘Two Selves’ operation of our personality or 
intentionality or EP etc.) the prolific Daniel Hutto’s approach is called 
‘Radical Enactivism’ and is well explained in numerous recent books and 
papers. It is a development of or version of the Embodied Mind ideas now 
current and, cleansed of its jargon, it is a straightforward extension of 
Wittgenstein’s 2nd and 3rd period writings (though Hutto seems only 
intermittently aware of this). 
 
The basic idea of the Embodied Mind or Enactivism is that much of behavior 
is automated and does not involve representations (basically S2 dispositions-
see Hutto’s lovely dissection of the ‘representation rats nest’ in his online 
papers). To me this is just another way of stating the fact that System 1 
precedes the operation of System 2 which is a standard feature of 
contemporary psychology, which I have explained above and in further 
detail in my reviews of Wittgenstein (hereafter W-who was the first to see this 
and explored it in great detail) and Searle (hereafter S-who called it The 
Phenomenological Illusion in his superb essay of this name in his book 
Philosophy in a New Century, which I have also reviewed). Since these are 
basic incontrovertible facts of animal behavior and I have already discussed 
them I won’t dwell on it here. 
 
This book is a sustained argument against other similar ways of describing 
behavior which he calls CEC and CIC in favor of REC (Radical Embodied 
Cognition), which he characterizes as “the strongest reading of the 
embodiment thesis—one that uncompromisingly maintains that basic 
cognition is literally constituted by, and to be understood in terms of concrete 
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patterns of environmental situated organismic activity, nothing more or less” 
(p11). This is clear as a bell if you understand the two systems view explained 
above but likely opaque if you don’t.  Much clearer is Fodor’s characterization 
which he quotes as “abilities are prior to theories”, that “competence is prior 
to content” and that “knowing how is the paradigm cognitive state and it is 
prior to knowing that” (p10). That is, the unconscious automatisms of S1 are 
evolutionarily and behaviorally prior to the slow conscious dispositions of 
S2. 
 
This is classic Hutto high-level philosophical dialog, which is quite elegant, 
but somewhat too dense and a tad pretentious for the rest of us. I have not 
before encountered his coauthor Myin, so can’t say how much of this text is 
really due to him. It is clear from this and the rest of Hutto’s work that (like 
everyone else) he has not quite kept up with the latest work in psychology 
nor really grasped the full power of W or S, even though he is one of the top 
Wittgensteinians alive and as bright as anyone in the field. His discussions of 
the language games of “information” and “representation” in his other 
papers and books (and much else including his deconstructions of Dennett 
and Fodor) should be required reading for anyone interested in behavior. So, 
I have the greatest respect for him, but one hopes that he will mellow with 
time and write descriptions of behavior (i.e., all we can really do as 
philosophers according to W) in more mundane prose such as this lovely 
summation on p15. “Hence, REC is nothing less than a fundamental 
rethinking of the very foundations of standard approaches to cognitive 
science and philosophy of mind.” Yes, and what a pity that this great 
Wittgensteinian (and everyone else) does not realize that W laid it all out with 
unmatched clarity in his third period works over 60 years ago. 
 
I have much less sympathy for the extended and scaffolded minds of Chap 7. 
I don’t see how one can lay the burden of explaining how the ‘mind’ works at 
Searle’s door, nor how the convoluted prose about “decoupled contentful 
activities” etc. helps at all. Why not just say that automated unconscious 
prelinguistic S1 feeds deliberate, conscious linguistic S2, which is 
axiomatically extended by public language into the myriad wonders of 
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culture (S3)? Beginning and end of story. 
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Their last chapter is about “regaining consciousness,” but I would say that if 
one has understood Wittgenstein and Searle, one has never lost it. And, 
though this is an excellent book by two of the brightest and the best, I suggest 
an even better filter for folly is mulling over my thoughts in this and other 
reviews, and reading Johnston and the latest from Searle, along of course with 
as much of 3rd period W as feasible. In sum an excellent book with various 
faults which I try to correct. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my 
writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, 
Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 
3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) 
 
 
 
 
"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its 
correctness: nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is 
the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false." 
Wittgenstein OC 94 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then 
the activities of the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" 
p6 (1933) 
 
"Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of 
simply describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are 
neglecting to remind yourself of the most important facts." Wittgenstein Z 220 
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor 
deduces anything...One might give the name `philosophy' to what is possible 
before all new discoveries and inventions." Wittgenstein PI 126 
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"What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of man, not 
curiosities; however, but rather observations on facts which no one has 
doubted and which have only gone unremarked because they are always 
before our eyes." Wittgenstein RFM I p142 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops 
anyway." Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
 
"The greatest danger here is wanting to observe oneself." LWPP1, 459 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact 
which corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply 
repeating the sentence (this has to do with the Kantian solution to the 
problem of philosophy)." Wittgenstein CV p10 (1931) 
 
“But you cannot explain a physical system such as a typewriter or a brain by 
identifying a pattern which it shares with its computational simulation, 
because the existence of the pattern does not explain how the system actually 
works as a physical system. …In sum, the fact that the attribution of syntax 
identifies no further causal powers is fatal to the claim that programs provide 
causal explanations of cognition… There is just a physical mechanism, the 
brain, with its various real physical and physical/mental causal levels of 
description.” Searle PNC p101-103 
 
“Can there be reasons for action which are binding on a rational agent just in 
virtue of the nature of the fact reported in the reason statement, and 
independently of the agent’s desires, values, attitudes and evaluations? ... The 
real paradox of the traditional discussion is that it tries to pose Hume’s 
guillotine, the rigid fact- value distinction, in a vocabulary, the use of which 
already presupposes the falsity of the distinction.” Searle PNC p165-171 
 
“…all status functions and hence all of institutional reality, with the exception 
of language, are created by speech acts that have the logical form of 
Declarations…the forms of the status function in question are almost 
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invariably matters of deontic powers…to recognize something as a right, 
duty, obligation, requirement and so on is to recognize a reason for 
action…these deontic structures make possible desire-independent reasons 
for action…The general point is very clear: the creation of the general field of 
desire-based reasons for action presupposed the acceptance of a system of 
desire-independent reasons for action.” Searle PNC p34-49 
 
“Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality… Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is 
not consciously experienced…it does not exist…This is… the 
phenomenological illusion.” Searle PNC p115-117 
 
“Consciousness is causally reducible to brain processes…and consciousness 
has no causal powers of its own in addition to the causal powers of the 
underlying neurobiology…But causal reducibility does not lead to 
ontological reducibility…consciousness only exists as experienced…and 
therefore it cannot be reduced to something that has a third person ontology, 
something that exists independently of experiences.” Searle PNC 155-6 
 
“…the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do 
with conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can 
stand in an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional 
relations always determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is 
defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of satisfactions, it turns 
out that all intentionality is a matter of propositions.” Searle PNC p193 
 
“Cognitive systems don’t ‘pick up’ or ‘take in’ any informational contents; 
there are no such things as informational contents to take in.”  Hutto RE pxvi 
 
Before commenting in detail on Radicalizing Enactivism (RE) I will first offer 
some comments on philosophy (descriptive psychology) and its relationship 
to contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle 
(S) and Wittgenstein (W), since I feel that this is the best way to place any 
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commentator on behavior in proper perspective. 
 
Wittgenstein is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human behavior. 
His work as a whole shows that all behavior is an extension of innate true-
only axioms and that our conscious ratiocination (now called System 2) (S2) 
emerges from unconscious machinations (System 1) (S1). See "On 
Certainty"(OC) for his final extended treatment of this idea-and my review 
thereof for preparation. His corpus can be seen as the foundation for all 
description of animal behavior, revealing how the mind works and indeed 
must work. The "must" is entailed by the fact that all brains share a common 
ancestry and common genes and so there is only one basic way they work, 
that this necessarily has an axiomatic structure, that all higher animals share 
the same evolved psychology based on inclusive fitness, and that in humans 
this is extended into a personality (a cognitive or phenomenological illusion) 
based on throat muscle contractions (language) that evolved to manipulate 
others (with variations that can be regarded as trivial). 
 
All of W's and S’s work as a development of or variation on these ideas. 
Another major theme here, and of course in all discussion of human behavior, 
is the need to separate the genetically programmed automatisms, which 
underlie all behavior, from the effects of culture. Though few philosophers, 
psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists etc., explicitly discuss this in a 
comprehensive way, it can be seen as the major problem they are dealing 
with. I suggest it will prove of the greatest value to consider all study of 
higher order behavior as an effort to tease apart not only fast and slow 
thinking (e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions- S1 and S2- 
-see below), but nature and nurture. 
 
Because there is only ONE human psychology (for the same reason there is 
only ONE human cardiology), anyone accurately describing behavior must 
be voicing some variant or extension of what W and S have said and they 
should be easily translatable into one another. If not, one should be discarded 
and in my view that will rarely be W or S. 
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What W laid out in his final period (and throughout his earlier work in a less 
clear way) are the foundations of evolutionary psychology (EP), or if you 
prefer, psychology, cognitive linguistics, intentionality, higher order thought 
or just animal behavior. Sadly, almost nobody seems to realize that his works 
are a unique textbook of descriptive psychology that is as relevant now as the 
day it was written. He is almost universally ignored by psychology and other 
behavioral sciences and humanities, and even those few who have more or 
less understood him, have not realized the extent of his anticipation of the 
latest work on EP and cognitive illusions (Theory of Mind, framing, the two 
selves of fast and slow thinking etc., -- see below). Searle’s work as a whole 
provides a stunning description of higher order social behavior that is 
possible because of the recent evolution of genes for dispositional 
psychology, while the later W shows how it is based on true only unconscious 
axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious dispositional propositional 
thinking of S2. 
 
Long before Searle, W rejected the idea that the Bottom Up approaches of 
physiology, experimental psychology and computation (e.g., Behaviorism, 
Functionalism, Strong AI, DST, CTM, etc.) could reveal what his Top Down 
deconstructions of Language Games (LG's) did. The principal difficulties he 
noted are to understand what is always in front of our eyes (we can now see 
this as obliviousness to System 1 (roughly what S calls ‘the phenomenological 
illusion’) and to capture vagueness ("The greatest difficulty in these 
investigations is to find a way of representing vagueness" LWPP1, 347). 
 
As with his other aphorisms, I suggest one should take seriously W’s 
comment that even if God could look into our mind he could not see what we 
are thinking--this should be the motto of the Embodied Mind and, as S makes 
clear, of Cognitive Psychology. But God could see what we are perceiving 
and remembering and our reflexive thinking and acting, since these S1 
functions are always causal mental states while S2 dispositions are only 
potentially CMS. I claim this is not a theory but a fact about our grammar and 
our physiology. S muddies the waters here because he sometimes refers to 
dispositions as mental states as well, but as W did long ago, he shows that the 
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language of causality just does not apply to the higher order emergent S2 
descriptions—again not a theory but a description about how language 
(thinking) works. 
 
Some of W's favorite topics in his later second and his third periods are the 
different (but interdigitating) LG's of fast and slow thinking (System 1 and 2 
or roughly Primary Language Games (PLG's) and Secondary Language 
Games (SLG's) of the Inner and the Outer--see e.g., Johnston-‘Wittgenstein: 
Rethinking the Inner’ on how confusing the two is a major industry in 
philosophy and psychology (but it’s a universal mistake we all make), the 
impossibility of private language and the axiomatic structure of all behavior. 
Verbs like ‘thinking’, ‘seeing’ first described S1 functions but as S2 evolved 
they came to be applied to it as well, leading to the whole mythology of the 
inner resulting from e.g., trying to refer to imagining as if it were seeing 
pictures inside the brain. The PLG's are utterances by and descriptions of our 
involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, mirror neuron, true only, 
nonpropositional, mental states- our perceptions and memories and 
involuntary acts (including System 1 Truths and UA1 (Understanding of 
Agency 1) and Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger) which can be described 
causally, while the evolutionarily later SLG's are expressions or descriptions 
of voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, mentalizing neurons, testable true or 
false, propositional, Truth2 and UA2 and Emotions2- joyfulness, loving, 
hating, the dispositional (and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, 
intending, thinking, knowing, believing, etc. which can only be described in 
terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to describe System 2 in terms 
of neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, just make no sense--see W 
for many examples and Searle for good disquisitions on this). 
 
 
It is not possible to describe the automatisms of System 1 in terms of reasons 
(e.g., `I see that as an apple because...') unless you want to give a reason in 
terms of EP, genetics, physiology, and as W has demonstrated repeatedly, it 
is meaningless to give "explanations" with the proviso that they will make 
sense in the future--they make sense now or never. 
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A powerful heuristic is to separate behavior and experience into 
Intentionality 1 and Intentionality 2 (e.g., Thinking 1 and Thinking 2, 
Emotions 1 and Emotions 2 etc.) and even into Truths 1 (T only axioms) and 
Truths 2 (empirical extensions or "Theorems" which result from the logical 
extension of Truths 1). W recognized that ` Nothing is Hidden'--i.e., our whole 
psychology and all the answers to all philosophical questions are here in our 
language (our life) and that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to 
recognize them as always here in front of us--we just have to stop trying to 
look deeper. 
 
The true-only axioms, most thoroughly explored in 'On Certainty', are W's 
(and later S's) "bedrock" or "background" i.e., evolutionary psychology, which 
are traceable to the automated true-only reactions of bacteria and their 
descendants (e.g., humans), which evolved and operate by the mechanism of 
inclusive fitness (IF)--see Bourke's superb "Principles of Social Evolution". 
 
W insisted that we should regard our analysis of behavior as descriptions 
rather than explanations, but of course these too are complex language games 
and one person's description is another’s explanation. Beginning with their 
innate true-only, nonempirical (automated and nonchangeable) responses to 
the world, animals extend their axiomatic understanding via deductions into 
further true only understandings ("theorems" as we might call them, but this 
is a complex language game even in the context of mathematics). 
 
Tyrannosaurs and mesons become as unchallengeable as the existence of our 
two hands or our breathing. This dramatically changes one’s view of human 
nature. Theory of Mind (TOM) is not a theory at all but a group of true- only 
Understandings of Agency (UA --a term I devised 10 years ago) which 
newborn animals (including flies and worms if UA is suitably defined) have 
and subsequently extend greatly (in higher eukaryotes). However, as I note 
here, W made it very clear that for much of intentionality there are System 1 
and System 2 versions (language games)-the fast unconscious UA1 and the 
Slow conscious UA2 and of course these are heuristics for multifaceted 
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phenomena. Although the raw material for S2 is S1, S2 also feeds back into 
S1— higher cortical feedback to the lowest levels of perception, memory, 
reflexive thinking that is a fundamental of psychology. Many of W’s 
examples explore this two way street (e.g., see the discussions of the 
duck/rabbit and ‘seeing as’ in Johnston). 
 
 
I think it is clear that the innate true-only axioms W is occupied with 
throughout his work, and almost exclusively in his last work `On Certainty', 
are equivalent to the fast thinking or System 1 that is at the center of current 
research (e.g., see Kahneman--"Thinking Fast and Slow", but he has no idea 
W laid out the framework some 75 years ago), which is involuntary and 
unconscious and which corresponds to the mental states of perception 
(including UOA1) and memory and involuntary acts, as W notes over and 
over in endless examples. One might call these "intracerebral reflexes"(maybe 
99% of all our cerebration if measured by energy use in the brain). 
 
Our slow or reflective, more or less "conscious" (beware another network of 
language games!) second-self brain activity corresponds to what W 
characterized as "dispositions" or "inclinations", which refer to abilities or 
possible actions, are not mental states (or not in the same sense), and do not 
have any definite time of occurrence and/or duration. But disposition words 
like "knowing", "understanding", "thinking", "believing", which W discussed 
extensively, have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar philosophical use 
(but graduating into everyday uses) which refers to the true-only sentences 
resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 
psychology (`I know these are my hands'), and the S2 one, which is their 
normal use as dispositions, which can be acted out, and which can become 
true or false (`I know my way home'). 
 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, 
economics (e.g., Kahneman's Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names 
like "cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", "heuristics" and "biases". Of 
course these too are language games so there will be more and less useful 
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ways to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from "pure" 
System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but 
presumably not ever of slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any 
System 2 thought or intentional action cannot occur without involving much 
of the intricate network of "cognitive modules", "inference engines", 
"intracerebral reflexes", "automatisms", "cognitive axioms", "background" or 
"bedrock" (as W and later Searle call our EP). 
 
Finally, let me suggest that with this perspective, W is not obscure, difficult or 
irrelevant but scintillating, profound and crystal clear, that he writes 
aphoristically and telegraphically because we think and behave that way, and 
that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. 
 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality 
(the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look 
at the table of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have 
constructed over the last few years. It is based on a much simpler one from 
Searle, which in turn owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in 
modified form tables being used by current researchers in the psychology of 
thinking processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove 
interesting to compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on 
Human Nature. I offer this table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I 
find more complete and useful than any other framework I have seen and not 
as a final or complete analysis, which would have to be three dimensional 
with hundreds (at least) of arrows going in many directions with many 
(perhaps all) pathways between S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very 
distinction between S1 and S2, cognition and willing, perception and 
memory, between feeling, knowing, believing and expecting etc. are 
arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words are contextually sensitive and 
most have several utterly different uses (meanings or COS). Many complex 
charts have been published by scientists but I find them of minimal utility 
when thinking about behavior (as opposed to thinking about brain function). 
Each level of description may be useful in certain contexts but I find that being 
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coarser or finer limits usefulness. 
 
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind 
(LSM), the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of 
Thought (LST), the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical 
Structure of Personality (LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness 
(DSC), the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), 
Intentionality-the classical philosophical term. 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and 
Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle). 
 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s 
“impose conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate 
mental states to the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and 
doing, and his “mind to world direction of fit” and “world to mind 
direction of fit” by “cause originates in the mind” and “cause originates in 
the world”   S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless 
(lacking representations or information) while S2 has content and is 
downwardly causal (mind to world). I have adopted my terminology in this 
table. 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Cause 
Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change 
Intensity 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs 
Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and 
others as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by 
myself), while the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by 
others (or COS1 by myself). 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**          Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
***        Searle’s Intention In Action 
****       Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****      Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******   (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly 
called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive 
systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
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It is of interest to compare this with the various tables and charts in Peter Hacker’s 
recent 3 volumes on Human Nature. One should always keep in mind 
Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have described the possible uses (meanings, 
truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a particular context, we 
have exhausted its interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get 
us further away from the truth. He showed us that there is only one philosophical 
problem—the use of sentences (language games) in an inappropriate context, and 
hence only one solution— showing the correct context. 
 
EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE 
System 1 (i.e., emotions, memory, perceptions, reflexes) which parts of the brain 
present to consciousness, are automated and generally happen in less than 500msec, 
while System 2 is abilities to perform slow deliberative actions that are represented 
in conscious deliberation (S2D-my terminology) requiring over 500msec, but 
frequently repeated S2 actions can also become automated (S2A-my terminology). 
There is a gradation of consciousness from coma through the stages of sleep to full 
awareness. Memory includes short term memory (working memory) of system 2 
and long term memory of System 1. For volitions one would usually say they are 
successful or not, rather than true or false. S1 is causally self-reflexive since the 
description of our perceptual experience-the presentation of our senses to 
consciousness, can only be described in the same words (as the same COS - Searle) 
as we describe the world, which I prefer to call the percept or COS1 to distinguish 
it from the representation or public COS2 of S2. 
 
Of course, the various rows and columns are logically and psychologically 
connected. E.g., Emotion, Memory and Perception in the True or False row will be 
True-Only, will describe a mental state, belong to cognitive system 1, will not 
generally be initiated voluntarily, are causally self-reflexive, cause originates in the 
world and causes changes in the mind, have a precise duration, change in intensity, 
occur here and now, commonly have a special quality, do not need language, are 
independent of general intelligence and working memory, are not inhibited by 
cognitive loading, will not have voluntary content, and will not have public 
conditions of satisfaction etc. 
 
There will always be ambiguities because the words (concepts, language games) 
cannot precisely match the actual complex functions of the brain (behavior), that is, 
there is a combinatorial explosion of contexts (in sentences and in the world), and 
in the infinite variations of ‘brain states’ (‘mental states or the pattern of activations 
of billions of neurons that can correspond to ‘seeing a red apple’) and this is one 
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reason why it’s not possible to ‘reduce’ higher order behavior to a ‘system of laws’ 
which would have to state all the possible contexts –hence Wittgenstein’s warnings 
against theories. And what counts as ‘reducing’ and as a ‘law’ and a ‘system’ (see 
e.g., Nancy Cartwright). This is a special case of the irreducibility of higher level 
descriptions to lower level ones that has been explained many times by Searle, DMS, 
Hacker, W and others. 
 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat muscles 
to make complex series of noises (i.e., primitive speech) to describe present events 
(perceptions, memory, reflexive actions) with some Primary or Primitive Language 
Games (PLG’s). System 1 is comprised of fast, automated, subcortical, 
nonrepresentational, causally self-reflexive, intransitive, informationless, true-only 
“mental states” with a precise time and location, and over time there evolved in 
higher cortical centers S2 with the further ability to describe displacements in space 
and time of events (the past and future and often hypothetical, counterfactual, 
conditional or fictional preferences, inclinations or dispositions - the Secondary or 
Sophisticated Language Games (SLG’s) of System 2 that are slow, cortical, 
conscious, information containing, transitive (having public Conditions of 
Satisfaction- Searle’s term for truthmakers or meaning which I divide into COS1 
and COS2 for private S1 and public S2), representational (which I again divide into 
R1 for S1 representations and R2 for S2) , true or false propositional thinking, with 
all S2 functions having no precise time and being abilities and not mental states. 
Preferences are Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, Behaviors, 
Abilities, Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, Templates, Inference Engines, 
Inclinations, Dispositions, Emotions (described by Searle as agitated desires), 
Propositional Attitudes (correct only if used to refer to events in the world and not 
to propositions), Appraisals, Capacities, Hypotheses. Some Emotions are slowly 
developing and changing results of S2 dispositions (W - ‘Remarks on the 
Philosophy of Psychology’ V2 p148) while others are typical S1— automatic and 
fast to appear and disappear. “I believe”, “he loves”, “they think” are descriptions 
of possible public acts typically displaced in spacetime. My first-person statements 
about myself are true-only (excluding lying) –i.e. S1, while third person statements 
about others are true or false –i.e., S2 (see my reviews of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: 
Rethinking the Inner’ and of Budd ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology’). 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive acts 
and memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the 1930’s and 
termed “inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been termed 
“propositional attitudes” since Russell but it has often been noted that this is an 
incorrect or misleading phrase since believing, intending, knowing, remembering 
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etc., are often not propositional nor attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W and by 
Searle (e.g., cf Consciousness and Language p118). Preferences are intrinsic, 
observer independent public representations (as opposed to presentations or 
representations of System 1 to System 2 – Searle-Consciousness and Language p53). 
They are potential acts displaced in time or space, while the evolutionarily more 
primitive S1 perceptions memories and reflexive actions are always here and now. 
This is one way to characterize System 2 -the second major advance in vertebrate 
psychology after System 1—the ability to represent (state public COS for) events 
and to think of them as occurring in another place or time (Searle’s third faculty of 
counterfactual imagination supplementing cognition and volition). S1 ‘thoughts’ 
(my T1-i.e., the use of “thinking” to refer to automatic brain processes of System 
One) are potential or unconscious mental states of S1 --Searle-- Phil Issues 1:45-
66(1991). 
 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described by 
primary LG’s (PLG’s -- e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, NO 
TESTS possible so they can be True-Only- i.e., axiomatic as I prefer or animal 
reflexes as W and DMS describe. Dispositions can be described as secondary LG’s 
(SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the dog) and must also be acted out, even for me in my 
own case (i.e., how do I KNOW what I believe, think, feel until I act or some event 
occurs—see my reviews of the well known books on W by Johnston and Budd. Note 
that Dispositions become Actions when spoken or written as well as being acted out 
in other ways, and these ideas are all due to Wittgenstein (mid 1930’s) and are NOT 
Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, Hacker, Hutto etc.,). Wittgenstein 
can be regarded as the founder of evolutionary psychology and his work a unique 
investigation of the functioning of our axiomatic System 1 psychology and its 
interaction with System 2. After Wittgenstein laid the groundwork for the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought in the Blue and Brown Books in 
the early 30’s, it was extended by John Searle, who made a simpler version of my 
table here in his classic book Rationality in Action (2001). This table expands on W’s 
survey of the axiomatic structure of evolutionary psychology developed from his 
very first comments in 1911 and so beautifully laid out in his last work ‘On 
Certainty’ (OC) (written in 1950-51). OC is the foundation stone of behavior or 
epistemology and ontology (arguably the same as are semantics and pragmatics), 
cognitive linguistics or Higher Order Thought, and in my view (shared e.g., by 
DMS) the single most important work in philosophy (descriptive psychology) and 
thus in the study of behavior. Perception, Memory, Reflexive actions and Emotion 
are primitive partly Subcortical Involuntary Mental States, in which the mind 
automatically fits (presents) the world (is Causally Self Reflexive--Searle) -- the 
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unquestionable, true-only, axiomatic basis of rationality over which no control is 
possible. 
 
Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are descriptions of slow thinking conscious 
Voluntary Abilities— that can be described in SLG’s-- in which the mind tries to fit 
(represent) the world. Behaviorism and all the other confusions of our default 
descriptive psychology (philosophy) arise because we cannot see S1 working and 
describe all actions as the conscious deliberate actions of S2 (The Phenomenological 
Illusion—TPI—Searle). W understood this and described it with unequalled clarity 
with hundreds of examples of language (the mind) in action throughout his works. 
Reason has access to memory and so we use consciously apparent but often 
incorrect reasons to explain behavior (the Two Selves or Systems or Processes of 
current research). Beliefs and other Dispositions can be described as thoughts which 
try to match the facts of the world (mind to world direction of fit), while Volitions 
are intentions to act (Prior Intentions—PI, or Intentions In Action – IA - Searle) plus 
acts which try to match the world to the thoughts—world to mind direction of fit—
cf. Searle, e.g., Consciousness and Language p145, 190). 
 
Sometimes there are gaps in reasoning to arrive at belief and other dispositions. 
Disposition words can be used as nouns which seem to describe mental states (‘my 
thought is…”), or as verbs or adjectives to describe abilities (agents as they act or 
might act -‘I think that…’) and are often incorrectly called “Propositional 
Attitudes”. Perceptions become Memories and our innate programs (cognitive 
modules, templates, inference engines of S1) use these to produce Dispositions — 
(believing, knowing, understanding, thinking, etc., -actual or potential public acts 
such as language (thought, mind) also called Inclinations, Preferences, Capabilities, 
Representations of S2) and Volition, and there is no language (concept, thought) of 
“private mental states” for thinking or willing (i.e.,no private language, thought or 
mind). Higher animals can think and will acts and to that extent they have a public 
psychology. 
 
PERCEPTIONS: (X is True): Hear, See, Smell, Pain, Touch, Temperature  
 
MEMORIES: Remembering (X was true)  
 
PREFFERENCES, INCLINATIONS, DISPOSITIONS: (X might become True): 
 
CLASS 1: PROPOSITIONAL (True or False) PUBLIC ACTS of Believing, Judging, 
Thinking, Representing, Understanding, Choosing, Deciding, Preferring, 
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Interpreting, Knowing (including skills and abilities), Attending (Learning), 
Experiencing, Meaning, Remembering, Intending, Considering, Desiring, 
Expecting, Wishing, Wanting, Hoping (a special class), Seeing As (Aspects). 
 
CLASS 2: DECOUPLED MODE-(as if, conditional, hypothetical, fictional) - 
Dreaming, Imagining, Lying, Predicting, Doubting. 
 
CLASS 3: EMOTIONS: Loving, Hating, Fearing, Sorrow, Joy, Jealousy, Depression. 
Their function is to modulate Preferences to increase inclusive fitness (expected 
maximum utility) by facilitating information processing of perceptions and 
memories for rapid action. There is some separation between S1 emotions such as 
rage and fear and S2 such as love, hate, disgust and anger. We can think of them as 
strongly felt or acted out desires. 
 
DESIRES: (I want X to be True—I want to change the world to fit my thoughts): 
Longing, Hoping, Expecting, Awaiting, Needing, Requiring, obliged to do. 
 
INTENTIONS: (I will make X True) Intending. 
 
ACTIONS: (I am making X True) : Acting, Speaking , Reading, Writing, Calculating, 
Persuading, Showing, Demonstrating, Convincing, Doing Trying, Attempting, 
Laughing, Playing, Eating, Drinking, Crying, Asserting (Describing, Teaching, 
Predicting, Reporting), Promising , Making or Using Maps, Books, Drawings, 
Computer Programs–these are Public and Voluntary and transfer Information to 
others so they dominate over the Unconscious, Involuntary and Informationless S1 
reflexes in explanations of behavior ((The Phenomenological Illusion (TPI), The 
Blank Slate (BS)or the Standard Social Science Model (SSSM)). 
 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of 
language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at 
explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. It is critical 
to note that this table is only a highly simplified context-free heuristic and each use 
of a word must be examined in its context. The best examination of context variation 
is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, which provide numerous 
tables and charts that should be compared with this one. 
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Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and their 
analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in 
Wittgenstein and Searle 2nd ed (2019). 
 
I have commented previously on Hutto in my review of his “Wittgenstein and the 
End of Philosophy.” Probably the leading exponent of W’s ideas on the language 
games of inner and outer (the ‘Two Selves’ operation of our personality or 
intentionality or EP etc.) the prolific Daniel Hutto’s (DH) approach is called ‘Radical 
Enactivism’ and is well explained in numerous recent books and papers. It is a 
development of or version of the Embodied Mind ideas now current and, cleansed 
of its jargon, it is a straightforward extension of W’s 2nd and 3rd period writings 
(though Hutto seems only intermittently aware of this). He is also author of the best 
deconstructions I know of Dennett’s preposterous claim to be following in W’s 
footsteps (in fact Dennett is just repeating most of the classic mistakes in grandiose 
fashion and hasn’t a clue about W) and of Fodor’s LOT and other nonsense. But of 
course, one must read Searle too and the title of his famous review of Dennett’s 
book says it well “Consciousness Explained Away”. Incidentally, unlike most 
philosophers and other scholars, who make little or no effort to give the general 
public access to their papers, Hutto has put nearly every paper (though of course 
often just proofs and not the final paper) free online at www.academia.edu. 
 
 
The basic idea of the Embodied Mind or Enactivism is that much of behavior is 
automated and does not involve representations (basically S2 dispositions-see 
Hutto’s lovely dissection of the ‘representation rats nest’ in his online papers 
above). To me this is just another way of stating the fact that System 1 precedes the 
operation of System 2 which is a standard feature of contemporary psychology, 
which I have explained above and in further detail in my reviews of Wittgenstein 
(who was the first to see this and explored it in great detail) and Searle (who called 
it The Phenomenological Illusion in his superb essay of this name in his book 
Philosophy in a New Century which I have also reviewed). Since these are basic 
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incontrovertible facts of animal behavior and I have already discussed them I won’t 
dwell on it here. 
 
This book is a sustained argument against other similar ways of describing behavior 
which he calls CEC and CIC in favor of REC (Radical Embodied Cognition), which 
he characterizes as “the strongest reading of the embodiment thesis—one that 
uncompromisingly maintains that basic cognition is literally constituted by, and to 
be understood in terms of concrete patterns of environmental situated organismic 
activity, nothing more or less” (p11). This is clear as a bell if you understand the two 
systems view explained above but likely opaque if you don’t. Much clearer is 
Fodor’s characterization which he quotes as “abilities are prior to theories”, that 
“competence is prior to content” and that “knowing how is the paradigm cognitive 
state and it is prior to knowing that” (p10). That is, the unconscious automatisms of 
S1 are evolutionarily and behaviorally prior to the slow conscious dispositions of 
S2. 
 
This is classic Hutto high level philosophical dialog, which is quite elegant, but 
somewhat too dense and a tad pretentious for the rest of us. I have not before 
encountered his coauthor Myin so can’t say how much of this text is really due to 
him. It is clear from this and the rest of Hutto’s work that (like everyone else) he has 
not quite kept up with the latest work in psychology nor really grasped the full 
power of W or S, even though he is one of the top Wittgensteinians alive and as 
bright as anyone in the field. His discussions of the language games of 
“information” and “representation” in his other papers and books (and much else 
including his deconstructions of Dennett and Fodor) should be required reading for 
anyone interested in behavior. So, I have the greatest respect for him, but one hopes 
that he will mellow with time and write descriptions of behavior (i.e., all we can 
really do as philosophers according to W) in more mundane prose such as this 
lovely summation on p15. “Hence, REC is nothing less than a fundamental 
rethinking of the very foundations of standard approaches to cognitive science and 
philosophy of mind.” Yes, and what a pity that this great Wittgensteinian (and 
everyone else) does not realize that W laid it all out with great (and unmatched) 
clarity in his third period works over 60 years ago. 
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And again “By giving pride of place to embodied habits and skills when it comes to 
explaining how sophisticated mentality emerges, REC denies CIC accounts of the 
same. REC’s credo—that ‘we act before we think’ –is an outright denial of the CIC 
thesis that ‘we must think in order to act’” (p12). As noted above we are dealing 
here with the two senses of mentalizing verbs, or as I suggest Thinking 1 and 
Thinking 2. If not identical with CIC, Phenomenology is at least quite similar and 
so one really ought to read Searle’s “The Phenomenological Illusion” at this point 
and of course all of W3 (third period W) but there is no hint of this here. Finally, for 
anyone who still is confused “Enactivists are concerned to defend the view that our 
most elementary ways of engaging with the world and others—including our basic 
forms of perception and perceptual experience—are mindful in the sense of being 
phenomenally charged and intentionally directed, despite being non-
representational and content free. Defending this understanding of basic mentality 
is the primary aim of this book” (p13). 
 
This leads to his accepting Dretske’s idea that experiencing things (i.e., qualia such 
as redness) is (in my terms) a representational function of S2—i.e., dispositional 
(propositional) and hence true or false and conscious and slow, in contrast to S1 
which is reflexive, non-representational, fast and true only. 
 
Throughout Chap 3 he promotes the fast, automated reflexive behaviors of S1 (i.e., 
REC) over the representational, content possessing ones of S2 (i.e., instructionalism 
or intellectualism), but never quite gets around to using this common modern 
terminology. E.G., p49 top and p50 bottom. As always, one must be constantly 
aware of the quite different language games played with ‘conscious’, ‘cognitive’, 
reflexive, ‘representation’, ’information’, ’computation’, ‘subpersonal’, ‘automatic’, 
‘contents’, ‘function’, etc., which are typically used by both pros and amateurs as if 
their meanings were uniform and obvious. As one digs into the discussion on p59 
et seq. it is good to have in mind Searle’s lucid differentiations of observer 
independent intrinsic intentionality and functions thatconscious creatures have, vs. 
observer dependent ascribed intentionality and functions which we may attribute 
to the rest of nature (for a capsule summary see my recent review of his Philosophy 
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in a New Century, which also delves into the related issues of ‘syntax is not 
semantics’ and ‘structure (e.g., regularity) is not syntax’). 
 
Inevitably we run into the multifarious LG’s of ‘information’ (p62 etc.) which has 
drastically different uses and often refers to the true only (not really info bearing in 
the normal sense) non-propositional mechanisms of S1, but is commonly taken to 
mean the true or false content bearing propositional statements of S2 which is what 
he says flat out on p67. Naturally he quotes Dretske’s classic book on this. It seems 
Dretske’s most recent article on info is in the 30th Intl. Wittgenstein Symposium, 
which you can page capture and print direct from Amazon or GoogleBooks or 
maybe find on b-ok.org or libgen.io, but it’s got little to say, and the main reason to 
view that volume is to get Rodych’s latest article on W’s mathematics. H&M 
recommend giving up on info as content and adhering to info as covariance so that 
one can distinguish info processing “action oriented representations” (i.e., S2 higher 
order dispositional thought) from info sensitive (i.e., S1 reflexive response). If 
contentful properties can’t be reduced to physical properties then “…the 
explanatory project of naturalism with respect to them would be quite different—it 
would be to discover the set of fundamental bridging laws that explain how 
contentful properties relate to basic physical properties.  That would be the only 
way to solve what we might call the Hard Problem of Content.” Yes, we all want to 
know how S1 (teleosemiotics) gives rise to S2 (teleosemantic intensionality) or, to 
put it another way, mind arises from matter. 
 
 
They quote Jacobs: “In all of these cases it is not unreasonable to assume that the 
informational relation holds between an indicator and what it indicates (or a source) 
independently of the presence of an agent with propositional attitudes”. Mindful of 
S’s classic discussions, we realize that Jacobs is talking about derived intentionality 
and hence concepts of info that have nothing to do with human behavior. So, they 
are forced to conclude that “There is no naturally occurring contentful information 
that can be “used and fused” to from inner representations. Unless we assume that 
pre-existing contents exist to be received through sensory contact, the last thread of 
the analogy between basic cognitive systems and genuinely communications 
 25 
 
systems breaks down at a crucial point. (p70)” 
 
And once again: ”Taking an even stronger line on this holds that the interpretative 
response does all the work. This would surrender any commitment to the idea that 
informational content exists independently of the activities of cognitive agents.” 
(p74) Quite so! And so vanish Fodorian qualms about Darwin (p80) and his and 
Strawson’s Hyperintellectualism (p90). 
 
That is, no bridge from S1 to S2 at least via info. How about some Wittgensteinian 
therapy here?  
 
“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding the 
solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it 
were only a preliminary to it.”  Zettel p312 
 
But if we accept that the simple explanations we can give now are the only ones 
possible, what about philosophy and neurophysiology? Nothing about them—they 
will ever long for a completion they cannot attain. At least this is my take on things. 
 
And finally: “This is to accept that organisms often act successfully by making 
appropriate responses to objects or states of affairs in ways that are only mediated 
by their sensitive responding to natural signs, where this responding does not 
involve contentfully representing the objects or states of affairs in question (p81).” 
In my words, the automatic unconscious reflexive operation of S1 undergirds all 
behavior. When they note that perceptual experiences (i.e., S1 mental states) “…do 
not attribute properties to the world.  Consequently, they do not have built in 
conditions of satisfaction, nor do they possess veridical content, possess content that 
is true or false.” These true only S1 qualities ensuing from our axiomatic 
psychology, and their generation of the higher order thought of S2, are exactly what 
W discoursed upon so brilliantly at the end of his life (but it seems H&M, along 
with everyone else, have no idea). 
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Not only does the idea that the mental perceptual states of S1 are conceptual get the 
boot, but they might claim that “…the very nature of such perceptual content debars 
the possibility of ever fully or exhaustively capturing its essence by means of 
conceptual descriptive characterization (p97).” Inner states are what they are and 
since there is no private language and no way in the public one to describe them in 
a really satisfying way-- they will always remain “qualia”. But I think (and am 
pretty sure W would take the view) that “stabbing pain”, “bright red”, “green apple 
tree” and “galloping horses” are as good as it gets—that is, there is no useful 
meaning that can ever be given to “exhaustively capturing its essence”. As good as 
H&M are, I am afraid they have fallen into the classic philosopher’s trap so 
beautifully described by W. They reach the limits of language, so naturally they 
want to go beyond them. One can say or write anything, but one cannot mean 
anything. Must it not be either true or false that 7432 occurs in the decimal 
expansion of PI? As W showed, your intuition often leads you astray. 
 
Before reading the next few pages on Gauker’s Assumptions and nonintensional, 
nonpropositional, nonconceptual “content” (i.e., S1) it will be useful to read Searle’s 
old paper on unconscious intentionality (Phil Issues 1:45-66(1991)) which shows 
how S1 generates S2 “…the ontology of the unconscious is strictly the ontology of a 
neurophysiology capable of generating the conscious” as well as Johnston’s classic 
book ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ (or at least my review of it), -- especially 
the material on indeterminacy of language. And of course, to the list of those 
rejecting the propositionality of perception one should add W who anticipated them 
in detail by some 60 years and provided in his last period the good news (to balance 
the bad on p103) that S1 is the true-only axiomatic foundation of S2—that is, of all 
higher order behavior and so of course these aliefs are not revisable (p104, 105). And, 
since S1 is prelinguistic, it is hardly surprising that there “…is no conceptual content 
of perception to express” (p100). 
 
They are much exercised in Chap 6 to show that perceptual science, and illusions in 
particular, provide no evidence of representations or content in S1 and I applaud 
their conclusion that “…it is not clear what ‘possessing content’ really amounts to, 
or what work it is meant to do that couldn’t be done just as easily by assuming that 
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human beings share basic and content-free ways of responding directly to certain 
worldly solicitations and offerings.” That is, S1 is automated as modern biology and 
psychology shows. 
 
I have much less sympathy for the extended and scaffolded minds of Chap 7. I don’t 
see how one can lay the burden of explaining how the mind works at Searle’s door, 
nor how the convoluted prose about “decoupled contentful activities” etc. helps at 
all. Why not just say that automated unconscious prelinguistic S1 feeds deliberate, 
conscious linguistic S2, which is axiomatically extended by public language into the 
myriad wonders of culture?  Beginning and end of story. 
 
Their last chapter is about “regaining consciousness,” but I would say that if one 
has understood Wittgenstein and Searle, one has never lost it. And, though this is 
an excellent book by two of the brightest and the best, I suggest mulling over my 
thoughts in this and other reviews and reading Johnston and the latest from Searle, 
along of course with as much of 3rd period W as feasible, is an even better filter for 
folly. 
 
His second book with Myin ‘Evolving Enactivism’ appeared in 2017. 
 
 
